Trace Minerals International, a Utah corporation v. Eagle Security Corporation, a Utah corporation, its successor-in-interest, Alert One, a Utah corporation, Grant Ashby, and Jane Does, individuals, and Action Alarm, Inc., dba ACM U.L. Monitoring Station, an Arizona corporation : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
Trace Minerals International, a Utah corporation v.
Eagle Security Corporation, a Utah corporation, its
successor-in-interest, Alert One, a Utah
corporation, Grant Ashby, and Jane Does,
individuals, and Action Alarm, Inc., dba ACM U.L.
Monitoring Station, an Arizona corporation : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Henry E. Heath; Strong & Hanni; Attorneys for Appellee.
Robert C. Keller; Weiss Berrett Petty; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Trace Minerals v. Eagle Security, No. 20000561 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2823
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TRACE MINERALS 
INTERNATIONAL, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
No. 20000561 - CA 
EAGLE SECURITY CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, its successor-in-
interest, ALERT ONE, a Utah 
corporation, GRANT ASHBY, and 
JANE DOES, individuals, and ACTION 
ALARM, INC., dba ACM U.L. 
MONITORING STATION, an Arizona 
corporation, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT TRACE MINERALS INTERNATIONAL 
Appeal of Decision of the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Henry E. Heath 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellee Action Alarm 
Robert C. Keller 
WEISS BERRETT PETTY, L.C. 
50 South Main 
Keybank Tower, Suite 530 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801)531-7733 
Attorneys for Appellant Trace Minerals 
International 
JAN !) i „ j 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TRACE MINERALS 
INTERNATIONAL, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
No. 20000561 -CA 
vs. 
EAGLE SECURITY CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, its successor-in- Priority No. 15 
interest, ALERT ONE, a Utah 
corporation, GRANT ASHBY, and 
JANE DOES, individuals, and ACTION 
ALARM, INC., dba ACM U.L. 
MONITORING STATION, an Arizona 
corporation, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT TRACE MINERALS INTERNATIONAL 
Appeal of Decision of the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Henry E. Heath Robert C. Keller 
STRONG & HANNI WEISS BERRETT PETTY, L.C. 
9 Exchange Place #600 50 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Keybank Tower, Suite 530 
Attorneys for Appellee Action Alarm Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801)531-7733 
Attorneys for Appellant Trace Minerals 
International 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
REPLY TO ACM'S STATEMENT FACTS 1 
ARGUMENT 6 
ACM'S ARGUMENTS DO NOTHING TO CHANGE THE EVIDENCE ON 
EACH OF THE ELEMENTS OF JOINT VENTURE LIABILITY WHICH THE 
COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY IGNORED OR DISREGARDED IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE QUESTION 6 
CONCLUSION 12 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cases 
Basset v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 1974) 9 
Betenson v. Call Auto & Equip. Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684 (Utah 1982) 10 
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Utah App. 1997.) 3, 10 
Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996) 1,6 
Hunter v. BPS Guard Services, Inc., 654 N.E.2d 405 (Ohio App. 1995) 11 
Jaeger v. Western Rivers Fly Fisher, 855 F.Supp. 1217 (D. Utah 1994) 3, 10 
Other Authorities 
Restatement (Second) of Torts at § 876 5 
-ii-
REPLY TO ACM'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Where the Statement of Facts by defendant/Appellee Action Alarm, Inc., dba 
ACM U.L. Monitoring Station ("ACM") differs from that of appellant Trace Mineral 
International ("TMI"), ACM characterizes and draws inferences from the facts contrary 
to the applicable standard of review. Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1996) 
(on appeal from an order granting summary judgment the Court views the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party). To the extent they merit response, ACM's characterizations primarily concern its 
common economic interest in the venture with Eagle, the alleged joint venturer, and 
ACM's control over Eagle and the venture itself. 
With respect to its "common pecuniary interest" with Eagle in the alarm system at 
TMI, for example, ACM asserts it "had no interest whatsoever in whether Trace Minerals 
paid Eagle/Ashby, and, contrary to Trace Minerals' mischaracterization, Action Alarm 
did not provide the central station monitoring in return for a portion of the monthly fee 
Eagle charged TMI for the system.'" Appellee's Brief at p. 8 (emphasis in original). 
The material facts, however, are quite clear from ACM's agreement with Eagle: 
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2. [ACM] agrees to provide monitoring and notification 
services and [Eagle] agrees to pay to [ACM] pursuant to the current price 
list in effect at the time Installer's Subscriber [TMI] is to be put on line for 
monitoring service, and be subject to any future price increases. Service for 
each subscriber shall be paid for a period of one year or more. 
11. [Eagle] agrees to pay all for any licenses and all sales, use or 
business taxes or imposition by municipal, state and /or Federal authorities 
in connection with the services to be performed by [ACM] . . . . 
Record at p. 293 (emphasis added). Pursuant to this agreement, ACM charged Eagle 
$6.00 a month when TMI went on line as a subscriber, and then Eagle, in turn, charged 
TMI $20.00 a month. Appellees' Brief at p. 7. 
Contrary to ACM's extremely narrow characterization, these facts give rise to a 
strong inference ACM and Eagle shared a common pecuniary interest in the venture, and 
in fact shared an interest in TMI's payments. ACM's assertions completely ignore the 
economic reality that without subscribers, including TMI, Eagle would have no reason to 
contract to pay ACM any amounts for monitoring, much less have the wherewithal to 
meet its obligations under the agreement. 
Similarly, ACM argues "Action Alarm had no right or obligation to control the 
alarm design, installation or maintenance business of Eagle/Ashby. Further, it had no 
means of controlling the Eagle/Ashby business." Appellees' Brief al p. 8. Citing U.L. 
standards and the opinions of its own expert, ACM goes on to assert: "[ACM] has no 
duty as a U.L. listed centeral monitoring station under U.L. standards to approve or 
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disprove the installation of the alarm systems of its dealers," and ACM "does not bear 
responsibility for activities at the protected area involving equipment, location, 
inspection, testing, maintenance and runner service." Id. at 9, 11. 
These factual assertions both ignore contrary evidence in the record, and take an 
extremely narrow view of the parties' relationship, focusing entirely on ACM's control 
over the time, equipment or services Eagle contributed to the venture. Id. The inquiry is 
actually much broader, however, and examines ACM's control over the venture or 
enterprise itself, not the particulars of what the other party contributed to the venture. 
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Utah App. 1997) (describing, as one 
indicator of a joint venture, "an equal right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise, 
which gives an equal right of control.") (emphasis added); Jaeger v. Western Rivers Fly 
Fisher, 855 F.Supp. 1217 (D. Utah 1994) ("[A]'mutual right to control' exists in that 
each party controls separately a different aspect of the fishing expedition . . . "). 
ACM's control over the venture or enterprise, as opposed to the particulars of 
how the co-venturer Eagle carried out its own portion of the venture, arises by virtue of 
ACM's role as a monitoring station and agreements with Eagle. The Agreement 
provides in pertinent part: 
1. . . . [Eagle] shall provide [ACM] in writing the services to 
be provided to each Subscriber before [ACM's] acceptance of such 
subscriber. 
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3. Service to any subscriber shall become effective only (a) 
when [ACM] shall have received a completed Monitoring Service request 
Agreement and (b) when [Eagle] shall have sent an acceptable test signal 
on the monitoring equipment provided by [Eagle] for the such Subscriber 
for each condition which is proposed be monitored for such Subscriber and 
said test signals have been received and acknowledged by [ACM] as 
acceptable. . . . 
7. This Agreement may be suspended, at [ACM's] option, as to 
any subscriber should the protective equipment on the premises of such 
subscriber become so disabled or so substantially damaged that further 
service to such subscriber is impracticable. 
R. at 293. 
These provisions giving ACM the power and right to have written information 
about the specific services Eagle was providing the subscriber TMI, to test the system 
and its signals and acquire additional information about the system, and to determine not 
to monitor an alarm system that had to be monitored in order to function as a monitored 
alarm system, are evidence ACM exercised control over the venture itself, as well as 
Eagle in relation to the venture. 
Moreover, ACM's assertions it had no control or duties with respect to the 
installation simply ignore the trial court's denial of ACM's motion on TMI's negligence 
claim because ACM owed TMI a tort duty of care, which ACM has not appealed. Partial 
Summary Judgment, Appellant's Addendum, at Tab 1. It would be anomalous to hold 
ACM to a tort duty of care if there were not facts and circumstances to suggest ACM had 
sufficient involvement and control and to carry it out. 
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Finally, ACM's strident factual assertions regarding the Affidavit of TMFs expert, 
Jeffery Zwirn, are not well taken. ACM argues: 
Trace Mineral's ninth STATEMENT OF FACT should be stricken and 
disregarded by this Court for two reasons: First, it relates solely to the issue of 
Action Alarm's duty to Trace Minerals and the negligence claim that was before 
the district court and is not before this Court on appeal; second, Action Alarm 
moved the district court to strike . . . the Affidavit of Jeffery Zwirn under Utah 
R.Evid. 704. Because summary judgment was granted on the issue of joint 
venture, the district court did not address Action Alarm's motion to strike the 
affidavit of Jeffery Zwirn. 
Appellees' Brief at p. 14 (emphasis in original). 
If the Zwirn Affidavit were relevant only to the issue of ACM's negligence, and 
not to joint venture, as ACM asserts, surely the trial court should have addressed ACM's 
motion to strike before denying ACM's motion on the negligence claim. This 
inconsistency apparently eludes ACM in its rush to explain why the trial court did not 
grant the motion to strike. 
Moreover, ACM wholly fails to inform the Court of the bases for the motion to 
strike and fact the motion did not seek to strike the entire Zwirn Affidavit. The motion 
to strike went only to portions ACM deemed to be "legal conclusions." Record at pp. 
560-66. In its brief on appeal ACM makes no showing at all that the facts from the 
Affidavit included in TMI's brief are simple "legal conclusions," or otherwise 
inadmissible. 
In fact, the assertions of the Zwirn Affidavit included in TMI's brief are relevant 
to both claims of independent negligence and joint venture. The trial court could not 
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find ACM owed a tort duty of care if there were not sufficient facts and circumstances, as 
outlined in the Zwirn Affidavit and elsewhere, to suggest ACM had sufficient notice and 
information to give rise to a duty and sufficient control and means to implement the duty. 
These same elements are relevant to a joint venture inquiry. Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 876 (describing, as one element of joint venture liability, substantial assistance in 
accomplishing the tortious result and that the joint venturer's "own conduct, separately 
considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person."). 
ARGUMENT 
ACM'S ARGUMENTS DO NOTHING TO CHANGE THE EVIDENCE ON 
EACH OF THE ELEMENTS OF JOINT VENTURE LIABILITY WHICH THE 
COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY IGNORED OR DISREGARDED IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE QUESTION 
ACM's argument in opposition to TMFs appeal continues the themes developed 
in its attempts to characterize the facts as narrowly as possible, instead of in TMFs favor 
as required by the applicable standard of review. "Tn reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d at 435, quoting 
K&T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah 1994). 
For example, ACM argues throughout its brief that construing the relationship 
between itself and Eagle as a joint venture "is akin to finding a joint venture relationship 
between the Green Giant vegetable company and Albertson's grocery store. . . . [S]hould 
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Green Giant be liable for a slip and fall involving a can of beans in Albertson's grocery 
store? " Appellee's Brief at pp. 15, 22. 
ACM's own self-serving characterizations and inferences are well illustrated by 
the distinctions between this case, and the analogy ACM relies upon so heavily. Suffice 
it to say that the trial court denied ACM's motion for summary judgment on TMI's 
negligence claim, a motion based on the argument ACM owed TMI no independent duty 
of care, because there were facts to suggest ACM had sufficient notice of, and control 
over, and involvement with, the particular alarm system at issue to give rise to ACM's 
own independent duty of reasonable care to TMI, the alarm subscriber. 
This is a dramatically different situation than that presented by ACM's analogy. 
Once a can of beans leaves Green Giant's possession, the company has no specific, 
express agreement with Albertson's to act together in handling or marketing the beans. 
The beans can and will be sold to the ultimate purchaser without any involvement by 
Green Giant whatsoever. If Green Giant were sued by a customer involved in a slip and 
fall because of the beans, there would be no evidence to suggest Green Giant owed the 
consumer an independent duty of reasonable care. 
By contrast, in order for a monitored alarm system to be sold to a consumer like 
TMI, the monitoring company must be involved in the alarm system. ACM has an 
express agreement with Eagle, the Albertsons in ACM's analogy, to provide the 
necessary services. The agreement gives ACM an ongoing pecuniary interest in the 
-7-
alarm system, and control over the system and its effectiveness. It is undisputed for 
purposes of this appeal that there are facts and circumstances to suggest ACM is 
sufficiently involved in the ultimate sale of the product, a monitored alarm system, that 
ACM, unlike Green Giant, does owe the purchaser an independent duty of care. 
ACM goes on to argue the Court should not find it to be part of a joint venture 
with Eagle in part because "Action Alarm has over 30,000 accounts that it monitors with 
hundreds of dealers throughout the country." The fact is that ACM's behind-the-scenes 
participation with these hundreds of alarm dealers allows monitored systems to be sold 
and marketed by hundreds of dealers who, unbeknownst to the alarm subscribers, do not 
have the financial or other wherewithal to provide the monitoring themselves. To allow 
the monitoring company to disclaim all relationship with and responsibility for these 
dealers as ACM attempts to do here ignores the realty that the monitoring company's 
participation in the ventures is what allows these dealers to sell the alarm systems they 
sell. Certainly it fails to protect the purchasers of monitored alarm systems. 
These facts and the duties that would normally arise therefrom are expressly 
recognized and illustrated by ACM's agreement with Eagle. As ACM indicates, one of 
the factors that indicate the existence of a joint venture is "a duty to share in any losses 
that may be sustained," "unless there is an agreement to the contrary." Bassett v. Baker, 
530 P.2d 1,2 (Utah 1974). 
In this regard, ACM's contract with Eagle states in pertinent part: 
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8. The Company [ACM] shall not be liable for any loss or damage 
caused by defects or deficiencies in the protective equipment of any Subscriber. 
Installer [Eagle] understands and agrees that if the Company should be found 
liable for loss or damage due from failure of Company to perform any of the 
obligations herein, including but not limited to monitoring or notification services, 
or the failure of the system or equipment in any respect whatsoever, Company's 
liability shall be limited to a sum equal to the total of one half the annual service 
charge or Two Hundred and Fifty ($250.00) whichever is lesser. As liquidated 
damages and not as a penalty and this liability shall be exclusive, and that the 
provisions of this Section shall apply if loss or damages, irrespective of cause or 
origin, results directly or indirectly to persons or property, from performance or 
nonperformance of the obligations imposed by this Agreement... . 
Record at p. 293. 
Thus by its own contract, ACM recognizes "a duty" might otherwise exists to 
share in losses, and requires Eagle to agree to the contrary. ACM simply ignores these 
facts in its whole discussion of Bassett, focusing it analysis as narrowly as possible on 
whether ACM could discontinue services if it were not paid. Appellees' Brief at pp. 16-
18. 
ACM's arguments concerning the control requisite for a finding of joint venture 
are similarly flawed. Citing cases addressing vicarious liability in the master/servant 
context, ACM argues that the control necessary for imposition of joint venture liability 
should be the same as that found to impose vicarious liability on an employee instead of 
an indendendent contractor. Appellees' Brief at pp. 22-23. ACM goes on to argue the 
ways ACM had no control over Eagle itself. Id. 
Unhappily, ACM fails to present any support or rationale whatsoever for its 
assumption the joint-venture control requirement should be the same or similar as that for 
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imposition of vicarious liability in the master-servant situation. Appellees' Brief at pp. 
22-23. In fact, as Utah Courts have viewed the situation, the joint venture control 
requirement concerns control over the venture or enterprise , not control over the other 
party to the venture. 
In Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1088 (Utah App. 1997), the Court 
described, as one indicator of a joint venture, "an equal right to a voice in the direction of 
the enterprise, which gives an equal right of control." Farmers Ins. Exch, 936 P.2d at 
1090 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Jaeger v. Western Rivers Fly Fisher, 855 F.Supp. 
1217 (D. Utah 1994), the Court noted as follows in denying the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on a joint venture claim because of the existence of fact questions: 
Both parties, thus, share a 'community of interest' in the performance of the 
common purpose,' namely a successful fishing experience for clients. Because 
both parties must work together to be successful, they share a 'proprietary 
interest.' Finally, a 'mutual right to control' exists in that each party controls 
separately a different aspect of the fishing expedition, based upon expertise. 
Id. at 1225 (emphasis added). Compare Betenson v. Call Auto & Equip. Sales, Inc., 645 
P.2d 684 (Utah 1982) (discussing "provisions for shared control of the interest or 
enterprise " in reviewing joint venture claim). 
As set forth above, the provisions of ACM's agreement with Eagle giving ACM 
the power and right to have written information about the specific services Eagle was 
providing the subscriber TMI, to test the system and its signals and acquire additional 
information about the system, and to determine not to monitor an alarm system that had 
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to be monitored in order to function as a monitored alarm system, are evidence ACM had 
the requisite control over the venture or enterprise, as opposed to the particulars of how 
the co-venturer Eagle carried out its own contribution to the venture. 
Finally, ACM's arguments concerning cases that have addressed the question of a 
monitoring company's liability are unavailing and largely inapposite. The fact is that the 
only court that has considered the question whether an alarm monitoring company is 
engaged in a joint venture with an alarm installer under a similar legal standard has 
determined the issue presents questions of fact which are inappropriate for summary 
judgment. Hunter v. BPS Guard Services, Inc., 654 N.E.2d 405, 418-20 (Ohio App. 
1995). The differences ACM points out between that case and the instant case are 
immaterial. 
The other cases cited by ACM do not even reach the joint venture issue. Thus 
whether the courts made passing references to alarm monitoring companies as distinct 
from alarm dealers in discussing contractual disclaimers or contractual limitations on 
liability which are not at issue here is unimportant. 
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF REQUESTED 
For the reasons stated above and in TMI's opening brief, the trial court's summary 
judgment dismissing TMI's claims for joint enterprise liability as a matter of law was 
erroneous. The case should be remanded for further proceedings in the district court on 
such claims. 
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A-, DATED this & day of January, 2001. 
WEIS TTY, L.C. 
Robert C. Keller 
Attorneys for Appellant Trace Minerals 
International 
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